A Case of Academic Misconduct: Does Self‐Interest Rule?*

Most analyses of academic misconduct focus on students’ integrity and what is taught at the universities. Surprisingly little attention is paid to the role of faculty members. This article presents an unusual case of academic misconduct that provides an opportunity to examine the actions and rationalizations of the students and faculty members involved in the event as well as the broader university context. The case is unusual in that the instructor initiated and facilitated the academic misconduct. The analysis of the misconduct and the subsequent events suggest that self‐interest rules and concerns for wider interests are all but silent. While the case presents a somewhat dismal view of the integrity of some accounting faculty members and future accountants, it provides interesting insight into self‐interest, rationalization, social context, and both students’ and faculty members’ integrity. The analysis discusses the mechanisms used to prevent and manage faculty member misconduct, along with limitations of self‐regulation and student reports as forms of control. The article also considers how accounting educators can encourage future accountants to act with integrity and concludes that in order to achieve that goal, accounting educators must serve as role models who act honestly.     

Corporate Control,Portfolio Choice,and the Decline of Banking

In the 1980s, U.S. banks became systematically less profitable and riskier as nonbank competition eroded the profitability of banks' traditional activities. Bank failures rose exponentially during this decade. The leading explanation for the persistence of these trends centers on fixed-rate deposit insurance: the insurance gives bank equityholders an incentive to take on risk when the value of bank charters falls. We propose and test an alternative explanation based on corporate control considerations. We show that managerial entrenchment played a more important role than did the moral hazard associated with deposit insurance in explaining the recent behavior of the banking industry.     

Re-Examining the Consumption–Wealth Relationship: The Role of Model Uncertainty

This paper discusses the consumption–wealth relationship. We use data on consumption, assets, and labor income and a vector error correction framework. This framework defines a set of models that differ in the number of co-integrating vectors, the form of deterministic components and lag length. Further models can be defined through parametric restrictions and, in particular, interest centers on a weak exogeneity restriction that says that the co-integrating residuals do not affect consumption and income directly. Key results in previous work relate to the roles of permanent and transitory shocks in driving wealth and how consumption responds to these shocks. We investigate the robustness of these results to model uncertainty and argue for the use of Bayesian model averaging. We find that there is a large degree of model uncertainty. Whether this uncertainty has important empirical implications depends on the researcher's attitude toward the theory used to motivate a co-integrating relationship between consumption, assets and income. If we work with models consistent with this theory and impose the weak exogeneity restriction, we find precisely estimated results that show that permanent shocks have only a small role in driving assets and that the predominant transitory shocks have little effect on consumption. These findings are consistent with the previous literature. However, if we work with a broader set of models and let the data speak, we find that the exact magnitude of the role of permanent shocks is hard to estimate precisely. Thus, although some support exists for the view that their role is small, we cannot rule out the possibility that they have a substantive role to play.     

Arbitrage Chains

A privately informed trader will engage in costly arbitrage, that is, trade on his knowledge that the price of an asset is different from the fundamental value if: (1) his order does not move the price immediately to reflect the information; and (2) he can hold the asset until the date when the information is reflected in the price. We study a general equilibrium model in which all agents optimize. In each period, there may be a trader with a limited horizon who has private information about a distant event. Whether he acts on his information, and whether subsequent informed traders act, is shown to depend on the possibility of a sequence or chain of future informed traders spanning the event date. An arbitrageur who receives good news will buy only if it is likely that, at the end of his trading horizon, a subsequent arbitrageur's buying will have pushed up the expected price. We show that limited trading horizons result in inefficient prices, because informed traders do not act on their information until the event date is sufficiently close. We also show that limited horizons can arise because of the cost-carry associated with holding an arbitrage portfolio over an extended period of time.     

Fact and Theory in Accounting History: Presentmindedness and Capital Market Research*

Abstract. Recent studies have begun to apply contemporary capital markets methods to historical, archival accounting data. This paper discusses period-specific issues relevant to such research. The general categories of issues considered are agency relationships and the capital market environment, trading practices, regulation, and corporate information disclosure. These contextual issues are discussed as they relate to the following business conditions in the United States during the first decade of the 20th century. First, the population characteristics of security holders were different, and a “money trust” comprised of investment bankers often controlled large corporations. This implies that careful thought needs to be given to assumptions about the role of publicly available information and “retail” investors in securities trading. Second, trading practices were quite different: stock price manipulation was tolerated, as were “wash” and “matching” securities transactions. These conditions, coupled with corporate disclosure of dubious quality and widespread colored financial press reporting, create difficulties in interpreting security price and trading activity. Third, while financial reporting regulation was minimal during the early 1900s, it is unclear whether government threats of regulation may have been regarded as sufficiently plausible by companies so as to motivate “voluntary” behavior. These facts suggest that contemporary researchers choosing to conduct capital market studies using data from historical time periods must fully consider the context of the period under study in designing their study, selecting data, interpreting results, deriving new theory, and drawing policy implications. Résumé. Dans des études récentes, on a commencé & appliquer les méthodes contemporaines d'analyse des marchés financiers aux données comptables d'archives. Les auteurs traitent des caractéristiques propres à certaines périodes passées, pertinentes à ce genre de recherche. Les catégories générales de caractéristiques qui sont abordées sont les relations mandant-mandataire et l'environnement des marchés financiers, les pratiques en matière de négociation de titres, la réglementation et la publication d'information par les entreprises. Ces caractéristiques contextuelles sont abordées dans leur relation avec les propriétés suivantes de la situation des entreprises dans la première décennie du XX^e siècle. Premièrement, les caractéristiques démographiques des détenteurs de titres étaient différentes, à l'époque, et une ? fiducie de fonds ? composée de preneurs fermes contrôlait souvent de grandes sociétés. Cela suppose qu'il faut analyser avec minutie les hypothèses relatives au rôle de l'information diffusée dans le public et des épargnants, dans les opérations sur titres. Deuxièmement, les pratiques en matière de négociation étaient assez différentes à l'époque: la manipulation du cours des actions était tolérée, de même que les opérations fictives ou simultanées sur titres. Ces conditions, conjuguées à la qualité douteuse de l'information publiée par les entreprises et aux rapports subjectifs abondamment publiés par la presse financière, soulèvent des difficultés dans l'interprétation du cours des titres et de l'activité du marché. Troisièmement, compte tenu que la réglementation de l'information financière était réduite au minimum au début du siècle, on ne peut dire avec certitude si les menaces d'intervention gouvernementale peuvent avoir été jugées suffisamment inquiétantes par les entreprises pour les avoir incitées à adopter ? volontairement ? le comportement souhaité. Ces observations semblent indiquer que les chercheurs contemporains qui choisissent d'étudier un marché financier en s'appuyant sur les données de périodes antérieures doivent pleinement tenir compte du contexte de la période étudiée dans leur plan de recherche, le choix des données, l'interprétation des résultats, la dérivation de nouvelles théories et leurs conclusions relatives aux conséquences de leurs observations en ce qui a trait aux politiques.